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Brain drain is a core economic policy problem for many developing countries today. Does 
relative inequality in source and destination countries influence the brain-drain phenomenon? 
We explore human capital selectivity during the period 1820-1909.We apply age heaping 
techniques to measure human capital selectivity of international migrants. In a sample of 52 
source and five destination countries we find selective migration determined by relative 
anthropometric inequality in source and destination countries. Other inequality measures 
confirm this. The results remain robust in OLS and Arellano-Bond approaches. We confirm 
the Roy-Borjas model of migrant self-selection. Moreover, we find that countries like 
Germany and UK experienced a small positive effect, because the less educated emigrated in 
larger numbers. 
JEL-Code: F220, J400, I210, N300. 
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For countries with substantial emigration rates, brain drain is a core economic policy 
problem.
1 The migration of Germans to the U.S. or Switzerland in the recent past, for 
instance, has been discussed as brain drain, because the high U.S. skill premia attract a large 
number of highly skilled Germans. Chiswick (2005) summarized that often the “best and the 
brightest” would leave their home country to emigrate to more promising labour markets.
2 In 
African countries, brain drain is perceived as an important issue, as well (Docquier, 2006). 
Although the health situation on the African continent is problematic, highly skilled African 
physicians leave and move in large numbers to the Western World because of higher returns 
to human capital. In a recent article in a leading medical journal, ‘The Lancet’, it was 
suggested that the recruitment of physicians from poor countries with high mortality ought to 
be treated as a criminal case because this would result in more people dying in the African 
source countries (Mills et al., 2008). Consistent with these approaches, we define ‘brain-drain’ 
as the phenomenon where, relative to the remaining population, a substantial number of more 
educated people emigrate. 
What determines the selectivity of migrants? Among other explanatory variables, 
relative inequality has been stressed in the theory of self-selection. If inequality is higher in 
the destination than in the source country, we would expect highly skilled individuals to 
migrate, as Borjas (1987) formulated on the basis of Roy’s self-selection model (Roy, 1951): 
higher inequality implies that the most educated receive higher relative wages. His views 
stimulated an excited debate because those who came to the U.S. from emigration countries 
with a high inequality like Mexico were expected to be negatively selected. That is, we would 
expect people with less education than the average person at home to migrate. We will call 
this theoretical approach “Roy-Borjas model” in the following, as Borjas applied the Roy 
                                                 
1 This includes countries like Germany, which just recently was reported as net emigration country by a leading 
weekly journal (“die Zeit” 10/2010). 
2 Of course, in today’s world of skill-selective immigration policies, incentives in source countries sometimes 
also impact on acquiring a good education in order to have the choice to migrate, even if the more educated 
individual does not migrate in the end. Furthermore, international migrants send remittances to their home 
countries that also have an important developmental effect. For example in the Philippines, remittances made up 
just over 10 percent of national income in 2007. In Mexico and India, the figures have even been higher. 3 
Model to the process of migration (Borjas, 1987). We introduce a methodological innovation 
to the migration literature by using anthropometric inequality measures. These are based on a 
large project in which evidence was collected on human stature as a welfare indicator (Fogel, 
1994; Steckel, 1995; Komlos and Baten, 1998; Blum and Baten, 2012, see section 3). 
The question on the impact of relative inequality on the selectivity of international 
migrants remains so far unanswered. Bruecker and Defoort (2006) find a positive correlation 
between inequality in the home country and educational selectivity of migrants in the OECD 
for the 1980-2000 period and develop a theoretical model that explains that better educated 
people can cope with migration policy hurdles. Furthermore, they find that inequality impacts 
positively on the human capital selectivity of migrants. Feliciano (2005) studies 32 immigrant 
groups in the US labor market and compares them with their source countries regarding their 
education and inequality level. Her results were not consistent with the Roy-Borjas model. 
Belot and Hatton (2011), however, find evidence for a modified Roy model for OECD 
immigration during the past decades.  
We contribute the analysis of a new and unique data set to this debate, as we can 
include international migrants from 52 source countries who went to five destinations in the 
Americas and in Europe during the era of mass migration (1820s-1900s). A migrant is defined 
as somebody born outside the destination country, hence no citizenship or ethnic definition 
contaminates the study of migration decision. The overall number of underlying individual 
observations is 6.2 million. We aggregate them by migration decade and by source and 
destination country pairs (minimum: 50 cases). We obtain 127 country pairs with sufficient 
underlying cases. Our evidence provides a unique setting to investigate the question at hand, 
because migration flows were not yet mainly determined by immigration policies, which 
nowadays shape migrant selectivity significantly.
3 We include U.S. data until 1900-1909, as 
                                                 
3 Germany, for example, attracted relatively low-skilled migrants during the 1960s and thereafter, because of the 
immigration policies at that time that aimed at providing unskilled labor for factory work, and the family 
unification allowances during the following period. Ireland on the other hand, attracted highly skilled labor in the 
recent decades which is partly due to its immigration policy, and partly due to large amounts of foreign direct 
investment before the economic crisis of 2009. 4 
the U.S. did not have strong immigration restrictions until 1919. Our Argentinean evidence 
covers only the migration until the decade of the 1880s, as Argentina was the first to impose 
strong immigration restrictions starting mainly in the 1890s (Timmer and Williamson, 1996; 
Sanchez-Alonso, 2008). The data studied here, therefore, provides relatively undistorted 
evidence of migrant self-selection. We include not only major transatlantic destination 
countries, but also European immigration targets such as the UK. Finally, we also study one 
destination country which had actually more emigration than immigration: Norway had 
significant immigration from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, but also Italy, 
UK, US and Russia. The major transatlantic destination countries are represented in our 
sample by the U.S., Canada and Argentina. This study is the first general assessment of 
migrant selectivity during this most crucial period of human migration history: the age of 
mass migration. 
We apply the age heaping approach which captures basic numeracy skills by looking 
at the share of people who are able to report an exact age. In previous studies, this measure 
has always been found highly correlated with other education indicators (see, for example 
Crayen and Baten, 2010a). It allows the calculation of the difference between migrants’ 
numeracy and numeracy of the source country population. We use this differential as the 
dependent variable and regress it on a set of explanatory variables.  
2a. Theory: the relationship between skill selectivity and inequality 
On the micro level, economic theory implies that utility maximising individuals base their 
migration decisions on the benefits and costs of migration. Provided, the skill set a migrant 
incorporates is sufficiently applicable in the destination country, the expected yield from such 
a decision is the income gap between destination and home country multiplied by the 
probability of not being unemployed.
4 Migration costs comprise all the psychological, 
physical and material costs of the journey and subsequent settlement in a different 
                                                 
4 During the late 19
th century, labor markets were not much regulated; hence obtaining a job at low wage was 
typically possible. 5 
environment. Since migration always requires a certain amount of cash or “out-of-pocket”-
money (Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004: p. 128), and credit markets are often imperfect, a 
poverty constraint exists, as the poorest often simply cannot afford the cost. This restriction 
explains why, during the process of economic development, migration rises, when a country 
experiences initial economic growth. The poverty constraint loosens and more people can 
afford to migrate. 
Migration costs increase with geographical and cultural distance, because travel and 
other costs (e.g. learning a language, religious differences etc) will be higher and the 
successful integration into the destination society might be more of a challenge. They 
decrease with growing diaspora communities in the target country, because friends and 
relatives living abroad might send remittances and provide valuable information, employment 
or other support for the newly arrived migrant.  
The impact of all these determinants on migration decisions is relatively well-
documented (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). What is less clear, however, is the question of 
what determines migrant selectivity. Borjas (1987) developed a framework based on the Roy 
Model to approach the issue of migrant selectivity (Roy, 1951). The basic model was 
originally formulated to explain occupational self-selection and its impact on inequality, when 
an individual has the possibility to choose between two options. Given that the skills are 
sufficiently correlated among occupations, the individual will select into the occupation that 
provides the highest expected earnings. Borjas (1987) adapted the model to migration 
decisions. Here, the migrant selects himself into migration to a certain destination country, 
when his skill set will realize more income in the destination labor market than in the 
domestic one. An underlying assumption is that the skills can be applied in both countries and 
are sufficiently valued in both labor markets. A second condition is a market with sufficient 
information so that migrants are able to respond to the incentive. The question is whether 
these assumptions are valid for the 19
th century, our period of study. Previous migrants often 
informed their friends and relatives back home about the situation in the target country by 6 
writing letters. While their letters were sometimes more optimistic than the real situation, they 
provided some insight as to the comparative welfare of skilled and unskilled workers. 
Moreover, a large number of migrants reversed their decision if the benefits were not as large 
as expected and returned home. 
To sum it up, according to the model, whether a person with a given skill level actually 
moves or not depends ceteris paribus on the relative inequality of source and host country. 
Positive selection occurs when the destination displays a higher skill premium than the home 
country (see, for example German or African migration to the US in recent decades, or 
Russian Jews moving to 19th century U.S.). Negative selection occurs in the opposite case. 
Belot and Hatton (2011) develop a variant of the Roy model to explain educational 
selectivity of migration flows into 29 OECD countries over the past decades. They also 
include immigration policy and poverty constraints. After controlling especially for a poverty 
constraint – as the poorest are not able to migrate – they obtain significant results for the link 
between inequality and selectivity the Roy model proposes. Moreover, they find cultural and 
geographic distance to be very important. Grogger and Hanson (2011) use data on emigrant 
stock by schooling and source country in the OECD. They confirm the Roy-Model in a sense 
that migrants are more educated than non-migrants and their selectivity is stronger, the higher 
the skill premium in the destination compared to the source country. 
Other empirical studies, in contrast, did not confirm the Roy-Borjas model. Bruecker 
and Defoort (2006), for example, find a positive correlation between inequality in the home 
country and educational selectivity of migrants. They argue that this is caused by higher 
abilities of the educated to jump over immigration restriction hurdles. Moreover, they find the 
same correlation for host country inequality. Feliciano (2005) finds no effect of income 
inequality on human capital selectivity for 32 immigrant groups in the US labor market, 
which also does not correspond with the Roy-Borjas model prediction.
5 So far, there is no 
                                                 
5 The Mexican case has attracted particular attention of scholars: Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) derive their data 
from the 1990 Mexico population and 1990 U.S. population censuses. They find that, while Mexicans are much 7 
general agreement about the relationship between inequality and human capital selectivity of 
international migrants.  
Moreover, the issue has not been investigated from a historical and a broad 
international perspective until now. Wegge (2002) and Abramitzky et al. (2009) provide 
valuable studies on country cases and Cohn (2009) studies the early skill composition of 
mainly English, German, and Irish migrants to the United States 1820-1860 using the 
occupational composition of migrants as a proxy. Cohn makes clear that it was the migrants 
themselves, who declared the occupations. They sometimes tended to make exaggerated 
statements about their social and occupational status at home. In a review of Cohn’s book, 
Kampfhoefner (2009) suggested to complement this approach with the age-heaping method. 
Mokyr (1983) pioneered the technique for the Irish case (see also Ó Gráda, 1986, for Baltic 
migrants to Dublin). Mokyr (1983) confirms that early migrants often reported occupations 
with high social status, but found that age heaping was significantly higher among Irish 
migrants than among the Irish population. While this is true for the whole pre-famine period, 
age-heaping on emigrant ships that arrived during the famine years was even higher. Also 
using education-based proxies, Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2009) find negative 
selection of Norwegian migrants to the US in the period 1850-1914, while Long and Ferrrie 
(2010) observe more upward than downward mobility among those who moved from the UK 
to the U.S. during the 1880s to 1900s. They made sure in a multiple factor analysis that this 
was not an effect of the move itself. They emphasized as a caveat that the mobility criterion -- 
the change between one of four broad occupational categories – implies that those who were 
already in the highest category (white collar) had no further possibility of upward mobility. 
Wegge (2002) finds in her study of the German principality of Hesse-Cassel no strong 
migrant selectivity as the poor were hindered by poverty constraints from moving whereas the 
                                                                                                                                                         
less educated than US natives, they are better educated than the average Mexican, indicating a positive selection. 
Moraga (2011) also studied self-selection of Mexican migrants to the US using Mexican household level data of 
2000-2004. Moraga finds a negative selection of Mexican immigrants, directly contradicting the previous results 
of Chiquiar and Hanson. 8 
wealthier had no incentives to migrate. Hence she finds mainly those with medium skilled 
occupations went across the Atlantic, namely those who could transfer their skills easily and 
were not bounded by poverty constraints (Wegge, 2002; Hatton, 2010). 
We extend those valuable historical studies by using the age-heaping indicator and by 
focusing on five destination countries and 52 source countries, offering additional systematic 
insights on this issue, taking a long-run, international approach for the 1800s - 1900s period. 
2b. Other determinants of migrant selectivity 
We expect transport costs and poverty constraints to play an important role. The log distance 
from the source country capital to the destination country capital multiplied with the decade-
specific cost is included in the regressions below to proxy migration costs.
6 As the inhabitants 
of many poor countries and the poor in medium-income countries simply could not afford the 
transatlantic journey and many could not even afford migration within Europe, we need to 
control for poverty constraints. As the poverty constraint might be less binding for a journey 
to a country which is closer, we multiply the logarithm of the distance with the measure of 
poverty to allow for varying intensity of this effect. 
Other important components in the model are chain migration effects and remittances 
that earlier migrants might provide. Previously migrated friends or relatives sent home not 
only money, but also information about the destination country, which decreases the 
perceived risk of migration (Cohn, 2009).  
In some European countries the travel costs of the poor were even paid by the 
municipal communities which wanted to avoid the social transfers (von Hippel, 1984; Bade, 
2008). This contributed to less positively selected migrants.  
How can we measure poverty constraints? We use the specification suggested by 
Hatton and Williamson (2002) which was widely accepted in the literature: the ratio of gini 
                                                 
6 The distance measure as well as data on colonial ties and common languages is taken from 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm . On the decade-specific costs, see Sanchez-Alonso (2008). 9 
coefficient divided by GDP per capita squared (Maddison, 2009).
7 This measure reflects the 
reality quite well, because both higher inequality (in the numerator) and lower GDP per capita 
(in the denominator) increase the constraining effect of poverty. 
Apart from economic incentives, political, cultural and religious factors might also 
play a role. In German historiography, the democratic revolution attempt in 1848 and its 
aftermath generated an outflow of highly educated individuals, who continued to play a role in 
American policies. We test whether the democracy situation in the destination country, 
relative to the source country, might have an impact on the selectivity of migrants.  
Eastern European migration was partly shaped by religious factors. The Jewish 
minority experienced strong discrimination in the Russian Empire during this period, which 
reached its maximum in the pogrom waves of the 1880s. During the 1880s, the mass exodus 
of more than two million Russian Jews began. But already before, a modestly numbered 
stream of highly skilled Jews left the country. Even if Boustan (2007) found that the largest 
share of migration can also be explained by wage gaps and other economic variables she 
agrees that there was an extra dip of Russian and Jewish migration in the early 1890s caused 
by religious persecution. Hence the pronounced selectivity was not only caused by economic 
incentives, but reinforced by religious persecution. Therefore, we control for such occasions 
whenever possible in our regressions. 
Finally, we control for common language and colonial ties. On the one hand, having to 
acquire a new language requires higher human capital of migrants than being able to use the 
mother tongue. On the other hand, advanced human capital can be more easily transferred 
between countries sharing the same language. This would suggest a positive effect on 
selectivity. While the sign of the effect is not clear, we would expect skill selection to differ 
for country pairs with the same language. Colonial ties often show the same features. A 
common culture and common institutions will make it easier for the migrant to adapt to the 
                                                 
7 Where GDP was not available, we used imputations based on anthropometric values, see Baten and Blum 2010. 
This method exploits the fact that for historical data, the biological standard of living proxies living standards 
quite satisfactorily. 10 
new environment. In the case of migration from India to Britain, the type of colonial migrant 
might have been quite often government officials who went to the colonies to work in the 
administration or military. Their families might later have returned to Britain, in which case 
we would expect them to be more numerate than the source country population.  
3a. Methodology: skill selectivity 
Age heaping is a method that uses the share of persons who report their exact age, as opposed 
to those who round erroneously, as an indicator for basic numeracy (Mokyr, 1983; Crayen and 
Baten 2010a, and 2010b). This indicator has been widely applied recently (A’Hearn, Baten 
and Crayen, 2009; de Moor and van Zanden, 2008; Clark, 2007; Humphries and Leunig, 
2009; Cinnirella, 2008; O’Grada, 2006). A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009) have shown that 
within societies characterized by a lower level of human capital, the frequency of people 
stating their age erroneously is higher than in more developed societies. The tendency is to 
mention a convenient multiple of five instead of the exact age, which becomes evident in the 
frequency distribution of the age data. The ratio of the frequency of multiples of five in 
relation to the frequency of all mentioned numbers is defined as the Whipple Index.
8 The 
ABCC index employed in this paper is a simple linear transformation of the Whipple index. It 
represents the estimated percentage share of the population who reported an exact age 
(A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen, 2009). 
 
The ABCC index correlates strongly with literacy rates, schooling and other human 
capital indicators, a relation which remains relatively stable across time and space and is 
robust when applied to different types of data sources. Generally, the age heaping approach is 
considered a viable method to capture human capital in empirical studies. The great advantage 
                                                 
8 The optimum is 100, i.e. an equal distribution of mentioned ages throughout the population, the extreme of 500 
occurs, if everybody mentions a multiple of five only. 11 
of age heaping is the great variety of sources, where evidence can be drawn from and its 
coherent construction over space and time (Crayen and Baten, 2010a).  
Our dependent variable which measures human capital selectivity is constructed as the 
difference of the mean ABCC Index of migrants ‘Mig’ and the mean ABCC of the source 
country population per decade. The latter includes both migrants and stayers: 
(2)         Sijt = Migijt – (Mig+Stayer)it 
where Sijt is the selectivity of migrants from country i to j in migration decade t.  
In our study, the source country numeracy is calculated as a weighted share of stayers 
and migrants if the migration rates reach a substantial number, since during the time before 
the migration decision, the migrants’ human capital still was part of the source country 
environment. 
The argument might arise that results are biased, if the census taking process in home 
and target country differ or if the states are differently institutionalized and therefore gather 
their citizens’ ages with different frequency. However, Crayen and Baten (2010a) have shown 
that the number of previous censuses taken as a proxy for institutionalized state-authority does 
not have a significant impact on the outcomes of the ABCC Index. Moreover, we will control 
for destination and source country fixed effects, which captures unobserved source and 
destination country specific effects. 
Another possible concern relates to the numeracy of migrants, which is based on 
questions posed years after migration, since in the meantime the migrant could have acquired 
further skills in the destination country. We did, however, counter-check our results with a 
sample of migrants that were obtained from ship lists, directly after arrival in the destination 
countries, and the correlation was very close (see below for further details). 
All of our numeracy differentials are arranged by estimated decade of migration. The 
ABCC of the migrants is collected from data of censuses taken in the destination country. As 
the census does not provide time of migration, we first used the age information to calculate 
birth cohorts and then assumed that the majority of the migrants migrated in their second 12 
decade of life to estimate the migration decade. In the census data, the year of immigration is 
not noted. All previous migration studies found that a significant majority migrated when they 
were around age 15-35, except for some children and a small number of older persons. We 
therefore argue that the period of migration decision must have been mostly two decades after 
birth and use this to calculate migration decades. This assumption has been counter-checked 
with lists created on ships, and we found it justified: The ages 15-35 are in majority by far. 
Even more importantly, the numeracy by decade and country is almost exactly the same when 
looking at ship lists (with known time of migration) and census data. Comparing all passenger 
lists of ships arriving to New York between 1860 and 1895 the correlation of ABCC values by 
country and decade with the census evidence is 0.6 (p= 0.00, N=105).
9 We then used the 
ABCC values of the source countries, which were also first organized by birth decades and 
then shifted by two decades to reflect the estimated decade of migration (Crayen and Baten, 
2010a).
10 The difference between the numeracy of the migrants and the source country 
estimate is the main dependent variable, as explained above. 
Finally, we need to address the issue of return migration. If census years were mostly 
at the end of our period, then we would have a mixture of return and permanent migrants in 
the one or two decades before the census year, and only permant migrants in the earlier 
decades. For modern data, Lubotsky (2007) has recently argued that temporary migrants can 
be very differently selected. How evenly spread are our census years? Fortunately, the census 
years are relatively evenly distributed over the era of mass migration. The U.S. data which 
accounts for the largest body of evidence starts already in 1850, and the numbers of migrants 
before 1850 was much smaller than later on. For Argentina, our first census evidence was 
                                                 
9 We included all ship lists which were provided by the transcriber’s guild (New York arrivals: 
http://www.immigrantships.net/nycarrivals1_6.html). Unfortunately, the number of observations is much smaller 
than in the case of census data – only some 300,000 compared to 6.2 million that we study here based on the 
census data -- hence we did not perform the same analysis with the ship lists. The advantage of ship list evidence 
is the possibility to determine the human capital status (and age) directly at arrival. One disadvantage is that it 
includes temporary migrants or travellers who returned home after a few months, but still the comparison to 
census data provides valuable insights. We thank Oliver de Marco for his immense contribution to this point. 
10 We only use the age group 23-72, to avoid age effects caused by selective mortality of the older age groups 
thereby obtaining up to a maximum of five cohorts with each census (those aged 23-32, 33-42, …, 62-72). 13 
from 1869, and Argentina did not have mass immigration until the late 1850s. Also for the 
other countries census dates are fairly spread over the relevant period. How large might the 
extent of bias from differences of temporary and permanent migrants have been? The 
implications of Lubotsky’s recent study for our paper are that temporary migrants can be 
indeed quite selective. He found that in today’s U.S., many temporary migrants were 
negatively selected, and after they returned, the remaining migrants were a different 
selection.
11 The question is, however, whether those effects of today’s period could also apply 
to the 19
th century, when transport costs were much higher. We can put this to the test to a 
certain extent. While there exist no official statistics, we are able to compare two groups, 
migrants identified in the census and migrants identified on shiplists. Those who were 
recorded on shiplists clearly included both temporary and permanent migrants, whereas the 
early cohorts of the census-based migration evidence might contain mostly permanent 
migrants. We were interested in the question whether the migrant selectivity in the two 
sources differs, which can shed light on the question raised above. For this, we used a data set 
of country-migration decade observation (US data), and subtracted the numeracy selectivity 
values of shiplist-based migrants from census-based migrants. We regressed this differential 
on a set of migration decade dummies to see whether there was bias in some of the decades. 
As a result, we find that the coefficient was sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but 
there was never a significant difference (Table 1). The overall arithmetic difference was –
2.21, whereas the weighted difference (weighted by number of migrants) was plus 1.36 
percent across all decades. Hence among the more prominent migrant groups (Ireland etc.) 
there was probably no negative selectivity among temporary migrants, whereas there was 
some among the smaller immigrant groups.  
Table 1: Regression of differences between census-based and shiplist-based numeracy 
selectivity estimates (Column 1), and comparison between selectivity by time period since 
migration (Columns 2 to 5) 
                                                 
11 Lutbotsky (2007) uses longitudinal earnings data from Social Security records to study the effect of selective 
emigration on the measured progress of immigrants to the US, whereas previous studies on income achievements 
were using cross-sections which suffered from temporary migrant selectivities. 14 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Migration cohorts  All  All  All  All  1870s 
Less than 20 years 
 
-0.96  -0.67  -0.84  -0.55 
in U.S. 
 
(0.290)  (0.378)  (0.291)  (0.747) 
Migration dec 1810  -5.67 
       
 
(0.523) 
        Migration dec 1820  -1.01 
       
 
(0.856) 
        Migration dec 1830  0.84 
       
 
(0.804) 
        Migration dec 1840  0.58 
       
 
(0.860) 
        Migration dec 1850  -3.41 
       
 
(0.291) 
        Migration dec 1860  -1.85 
       
 
(0.566) 
        Migration dec 1870  -1.99 
       
 
(0.556) 
        Migration dec 1880  2.14 
       
 
(0.641) 
        Migration dec 1890  -1.21 
       
 
(0.637) 
        Country FE  N  N  Y  N  N 
Time FE  N  N  N  Y  N 
Constant  -1.21  -2.17***  -7.53***  0.49  -3.80 
 
(0.637)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.599)  (0.005) 
N  105  205  205  205  70 
R-sq  0.04  0.01  0.65  0.04  0.00 
 
In column 1, the year indicates the migration decade estimate (1810 for 1810-19 etc). Reference category is 
1900s. Dependent variable is the difference between migrant selectivity according to shiplists in the U.S. (which 
includes both temporary and permanent migrants) and the migrant selectivity according to census. Migrant 
selectivity is always the difference between the numeracy of migrants and source country population in a specific 
decade. In column 2 to 5, the dependent variable is migrant selectivity according to the U.S. censuses of 1900 
and 1910. In the column 2 to 4, both censuses are pooled, because the attention is focused on the difference 
between migrants more and less than 20 years in the United States. In column 5, the censuses are not pooled, 
because the focus is here on the comparison of migrants of the 1870s migration decade only, who were either 
“permanent” migrants (longer than 20 years in the U.S) or “mixed” (permanent and temporary) migrants (shorter 
than 20 years in the U.S.). 
 
Moreover, we used the time of migration variable which is available in the U.S. 
censuses of 1900 and 1910. We distinguished migrants who were less than 20 years and those 
who were more than 20 years in the United States, which is a frequently used threshold. 
Within those two groups, we calculated the difference between their ABCC value and the one 
of the country and birth decade they came from. This yielded 205 country-cohort 
observations, each expressed as the difference between migrant ABCC and source country 
ABCC. This variable was regressed on a dummy variable “Less than 20 years in the U.S.”, 
whereas the reference categories were migrants who were at the time of the census more than 15 
20 years in the United States (Table 1, Col. 2-4). As we do not know whether the former 
migrants stayed later-on, it is a comparison between both permanent and temporary migrants 
on the one hand and permanent migrants on the other. There is always a small negative effect 
of less than 1 percent ABCC, but it is never significant.
12 In sum, if there was an issue of 
return migrant selectivity, it was probably small for this period. 
3b. Estimating Inequality 
A second methodological question was the measurement of relative inequality. Although 
Borjas’ original model looks at the standard deviation of wages, most recent studies on the 
model use Gini coefficients of the income distribution, because they are available for a large 
number of countries since about 1980. The underlying assumption is that wage variation and 
overall income Gini coefficients correlate.
13 For the 19
th century, data on inequality is scarce 
(see van Zanden et al., 2011; Blum and Baten, 2011), therefore we use an innovative approach 
to capture this independent variable, that builds on the work of these authors. 
Our core independent variable is inequality in the destination country minus inequality 
in the source country, constructed with an anthropometric method. Baten (2000) argued that 
the coefficient of variation of human stature is correlated with overall inequality in a society, 
and that it can be used as proxy measure, especially where income inequality indicators are 
lacking. The correlation has been confirmed in further analyses, for example by Pradhan et al. 
(2003), Moradi and Baten (2005) and van Zanden et al. (2011). This method has been widely 
used in the economic history literature (Sunder, 2003; Guntupalli and Baten, 2006). The idea 
is that heights reflect nutritional conditions during early childhood and youth. As wealthier 
people have better access to food, medical resources and shelter, their children tend to be 
taller than those of the poorer strata of the population. Hence, the variation of height of a 
certain cohort may be indicative of income distribution during the decade of their birth. 
                                                 
12 Another test compared those who were in the U.S. for 10-20 years and those in the U.S. 20-30 years taking 
them from the two censuses of 1900 and 1910 separately. The migration took place in both cases during the 
1870s. As result, the mixed group had a selectivity of -0.55 percent, compared to “permanent” group.  
13 Belot and Hatton (2011) use wage differences measured in the wages for occupations that normally require 
some skills versus some that do not 16 
Yet, while a correlation with income does exist, this correlation is only partial, since 
some important inputs are not traded on markets but are provided as public goods. These lead 
to modest deviations between purchasing power-based and height-based inequality measures. 
Deaton (2003) and Pradhan et al. (2003) have highlighted the importance of measures of 
health inequality in general. Heights capture important biological aspects of the standard of 
living (Komlos, 1985; Steckel, 1995). Also in migration decisions a proxy that captures 
overall welfare is relevant, because individuals not only maximize their income but also 
health and longevity.
14 



























UK  1880  34  1.66  Austria  1900  44  1.60  Russia  1880  49  2.48 
Italy  1860  37  2.00  Italy  1850  44  2.00  Russia  1890  49  2.09 
UK  1870  37  1.60  Netherld.  1890  44  1.32  France  1870  49  1.83 
UK  1860  39  1.67  Germany  1880  45  1.44  Belgium  1880  50  1.67 
Netherld.  1900  39  1.32  Germany  1840  45  1.62  Austria  1890  50  1.60 
UK  1900  40  1.51  Italy  1890  45  1.65  France  1860  50  1.59 
UK  1890  40  1.58  Germany  1830  45  1.46  Russia  1830  51  2.42 
UK  1840  40  1.67  Poland  1830  45  1.85  Spain  1880  51  1.83 
Italy  1870  41  2.00  Russia  1910  45  2.10  Russia  1860  51  2.43 
Netherld.  1860  41  1.32  Russia  1900  45  1.91  Spain  1860  51  2.04 
Germany  1900  41  1.59  Poland  1860  45  2.31  Russia  1840  52  2.32 
France  1900  41  1.84  Germany  1850  46  1.79  Austria  1870  52  1.60 
Italy  1840  41  2.01  UK  1910  46  1.50  Austria  1840  53  1.60 
Italy  1880  41  1.81  France  1880  46  1.67  Spain  1870  53  1.95 
Italy  1900  41  1.84  Belgium  1900  46  1.65  Belgium  1870  53  1.67 
UK  1850  42  1.67  Italy  1910  46  1.81  France  1840  53  1.76 
Netherld.  1840  42  1.32  Austria  1850  46  1.60  Spain  1900  53  2.00 
Netherld.  1910  42  1.32  Netherld.  1870  46  1.32  Russia  1870  53  2.65 
Netherld.  1830  43  1.32  Poland  1840  47  2.09  Russia  1850  54  2.60 
France  1890  43  1.49  Belgium  1890  47  1.60  Belgium  1860  54  1.66 
                                                 
14 To illustrate the effect of social inequality on the mean height and height variance of the population, consider 
two different allocations of resources after birth (on the following, see Moradi and Baten 2005): All resources 
are perfectly equally distributed among the people in society versus a situation where there exists an unequal 
distribution of resources. In the first case, the height distribution only reflects genetic factors. Despite perfect 
equality, we observe a biological variance of (normally distributed) heights because individuals are differently 
endowed with their genetic inheritance. In the latter case, the unequal allocation of resources allows some 
individuals to achieve their genetic maximum height because they have access to resources, while others who do 
not will stay shorter. In practice, while most height distributions are normally distributed or very close to normal, 
the variance of the distribution is larger than in the case of social equality. 
Moradi and Baten (2005) have estimated the relationship between income inequality and height CV for 14 
African countries and 29 five-year periods, controlling for the differences in income definition and population 
coverage. They found that height CV was significantly and positively correlated with the Gini coefficients of 
income. 17 
Netherld.  1880  43  1.32  Belgium  1910  47  1.58  France  1850  55  1.68 
Poland  1890  43  2.13  Belgium  1830  47  1.67  Belgium  1840  57  1.66 
Germany  1860  43  1.47  Poland  1870  47  2.09  Spain  1850  58  2.02 
France  1830  43  1.74  Austria  1860  47  1.60  Spain  1910  59  2.00 
France  1910  43  1.48  Poland  1850  48  2.37  Belgium  1850  59  1.67 
Netherld.  1850  44  1.32  Germany  1870  48  1.38  Spain  1890  65  2.09 
Poland  1880  44  1.99  Austria  1880  48  1.60  Spain  1840  70  2.13 
Germany  1910  44  1.55                 
Average    41  1.63      46  1.72      54  1.96 
 




All in all, the relationship between Gini coefficient of income and height gini is well-
established but was never before applied in the migration literature. The validity of height 
Ginis can also be counter-checked by comparison with other inequality evidence, such as skill 
premia, as Blum and Baten (2011) recently did. The authors kindly provided their data set, so 
skill premia can be compared with height ginis here. In Table 2, some of the height ginis are 
presented in ascending order, jointly with evidence about skill premia during the 19
th century. 
Skill premia are defined in this study as the wage ratio between a skilled worker in the 
building trades, and an unskilled one. If we take the average skill premium of the first column 
– which represents the cases where height ginis are low – also skill premia are low on 
average; much lower than the skill premia of columns 2 and 3, which are those cases in which 
height ginis are middle and high. There are clearly some outliers, but overall there is a 
correlation between the two measures (Correlation coefficient in the full Blum Baten sample 
is 0.48, p-value 0.000).
15 
Were the destination or the source countries more unequal during the era of mass 
migration? If we calculate the Gini coefficient weighted by the number of observations, we 
obtain 40.5 for the source countries and 40.3 for the destination countries. Hence there is 
                                                 
15 Clearly, the skill premium as a measure of inequality does not cover the entire economy and the assumption 
that inequalities between skilled and unskilled building workers reflects skill premia in other sectors of the 
economy might not always hold. On the one hand, sources of income like subsistence farming, household 
production, public goods and black market economies are not captured by skill premia. Those latter parts of the 
economy, however, can be covered quite well with anthropometric measures. On the other hand, wage 
differences are expected to result in differences in biological living standards. 18 
almost no difference between the two. If we include only those observations which can be 
included in the regressions below (Table 5, Column 1), the result is identical. 
Among the destination countries not represented in the skill premia data set, Norway 
and Canada had low anthropometric inequalities with values between 41 and 48, whereas the 
U.S. inequality was not low. Unfortunately, we do not have skill premia for Ireland 
separately, so we cannot compare this important source country. The overall inequality of UK 
was in the medium range. Poland, for example, had relatively low inequality. As the UK had 
higher inequality than Poland, we would expect more skilled migration from Poland to the 
UK.  
While the anthropometric inequality measures allow to cover many countries and 
decades, we were curious whether the results would be confirmed with other, non-
anthropometric inequality measures, even if those might be only available for a subset of 
observations. Those are based on direct income gini coefficients, ginis estimated based on the 
wage-to-GDP proxy suggested by Williamson, and the share of income received by the richest 
fraction of the population (van Zanden et al., 2011, explain how those indicators are 
transformed to become comparable). We test below whether those non-anthropometric 
inequality measures yields the same results as our basic specification. 
4. Data 
For measuring human capital selectivity of migrants, it is necessary to measure both the 
human capital of migrants and of the population of the source country. For the migrants, we 
use data sets from the IPUMS and the North Atlantic Population Projects that provide 100 
percent census samples for the late 19th century for a number of countries, and smaller 
samples for other countries.
16 We only use information on individuals that are older than 23, 
because younger people still are more aware of their age. For numeracy of source countries, 
                                                 
16 See data appendix. 19 
we use published national censuses of a great number of countries that were originally 
compiled by Crayen and Baten (2010a).
17  
Geographically, we cover 52 source countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, Asia-
Pacific and Africa to the US, the UK, Canada, Argentina and Norway as destination countries 
(Table 3). With our five destination countries, our panel allows to observe 127 country pairs. 
For some countries, we observe both immigration and emigration. The global nature of our 
data set allows an in-depth analysis of international migration during the 19th century. The 
migration decades range from the period 1820 - 1829 up to the period 1900 – 1909.
18 Cases 
with less than 50 observations are excluded. The U.S. immigration before the 1880s is better 
documented than thereafter, because the NAPP project provided a 100% sample of the U.S. 
census in 1880, and smaller samples before and after. 
Table 3: Underlying number of cases by source country 
 
Country  Cases    Country  Cases    Country  Cases 
Ireland  1877232    Mexico  45828    Barbados  1841 
Germany  1719228    Netherld.  42674    India  1208 
UK  978433    Austria  32834    Iceland  1159 
Canada  467201    France  29777    Uruguay  1050 
Sweden  205227    Russia  26044    Greece  845 
Norway  138013    Portugal  11362    Brazil  844 
Belgium  101223    Luxembg.  10902    Hong Kong  812 
China  86092    Spain  9274    Turkey  812 
Switz.ld  75371    Hungary  8589    Romania  751 
Czech  60458    Finland  8021    Jamaica  670 
Denmark  53816    Cuba  4683    Japan  548 
Italy  51385    Australia  2229    Bermuda  430 
US  47985    Chile  1978    Bolivia  244 
Poland  46183             
 
Sources: see data appendix. 
                                                 
17 In Appendix D, we show the age distribution 43-82 of the UK population (census 1881) and of UK immigrants 
to the U.S. in the American census of 1880. They exhibit the typical spikes at ages that are multiples of five. 
These are more extreme among the migrants, reflecting a negative selectivity in this case. 
18 In Appendix Table D.1, the average number of underlying observations is reported for each source country, 
decade, and destination country. 20 
 
5a. How did migrant selectivity develop during this period?  
We first take a closer look at our dependent variable, which is defined as the numeracy of 
migrants minus the numeracy in the source country (both in percent). For the investigated 
period, average numeracy was almost equal in the source countries (90 percent), and in the 
destination countries (89 percent). The average numeracy of migrants was slightly lower, 
namely 87 percent (arithmetic mean by source country), or 86 percent (mean weighted by 
migrant numbers). On average, there was, thus, no numeracy brain drain, but rather a 
mathematical brain gain for the source countries, because migrants who left in the 19th and 
early 20th century were slightly less numerate than the remaining population. The difference 
is, however, small so that it is more meaningful to look at the variation of brain drain and 
brain gain between countries and over time and to study the determinants. In the following, 
we analyze some prominent examples of emigrant countries sending migrants to the U.S. and 
UK. We arrange all numeracy values by migration decade. 
The largest migrant flows to the United States in this period came from Germany and 
Ireland. These migrants were mainly negatively selected for the early cohorts of our sample 
(Figure 1, Panel A).
19 We actually find 6-13 percent lower numeracy among those Germans 
migrating during the 1820s-1850s. Irish migrants display a stronger negative selectivity, 
perhaps due to the Great Famine years, since remittances sent over by previous migrants were 
also used by the less educated to leave the country. Those who migrated in the “hungry 
1840s” display a value that is 20 percent lower than those, who stayed in Ireland. Over time, 
this negative selectivity diminishes and eventually dissolves completely for the migration 
cohorts 1880-1900.
20  
                                                 
19 We consider Ireland separately, although it was part of the British Empire, because the characteristics of Irish 
migrants were different. 
20 Except for the small dip in German selectivity, this might have been caused by the economic crisis of the early 
1890s initiated by the Baring crisis. 21 
Figure 1: Panel A: Selectivity among U.S. immigrants from Germany and Ireland (“old 
migration countries”), as well as from Russia, Italy and Sweden relative to the source 
population, by migration decade. 
 
Sources: see data appendix. 
The year on the horizontal axis indicates the beginning year of a migration decade 
 
Figure 1, Panel B: Selectivity among UK immigrants from Poland, Russia, Canada, Germany, 
France, and Ireland, relative to the source population, by migration decade. 
 
Sources: see data appendix. 

























































Among the “new immigration areas” in Eastern and Southern Europe – and the Nordic 
countries such as Sweden – the development is quite different (Figure 1, panel A). The 
Swedes and Italians show a modest negative selectivity over the whole period with no major 
changes. In contrast, the Russian immigrants initially are very positively selected (although 
numbers of migrants were small). The earliest cohorts migrating in the 1840s are more than 
20% more numerate than their compatriots staying at home.
21 This is partly due to the fact 
that large shares of Russian immigrants were Jews, who have a reputation for being better 
educated than the overall population. Additionally, the high costs of migration from Eastern 
Europe translated in highly skilled first-wave migrants. Afterwards, there are probably strong 
“friends and relatives”-effects at work, also supported by remittances, as illustrated by the fact 
that the strong positive selectivity of the first decades decreases among the later cohorts. 
As a second example of a migration destination, England is a particularly interesting 
case (Figure 1, Panel B). Here, immigration is predominantly Irish in the first cohorts. These 
individuals are on average slightly positively selected (between 0 and 5 percent). Therefore, 
Ireland experiences some brain drain to England, but a brain gain migration to the US. Also, 
Poland and Russia, and to a lesser extent Canada suffer from brain drain effects due to 
migration to England. France and Germany, in contrast, did not experience brain drain with 
their modest migration flows to England. 
In sum, although migrants are on average slightly negative selected, the variation 
between countries is large. Especially during the mid-19th century waves of migration, some 
of the main source countries display negative migrant selectivity partly caused by payments of 
source country government institutions who wanted to send away the poorest, and partly 
financed by remittances of earlier migrants (especially important for the Irish migration, see 
Cohn 2009, for the German case see Bade 2008). In contrast, Eastern European migrants are 
quite positively selected.  
                                                 
21 The immigration cohort of the 1830s would have been even more positively selected, but we removed it from 
the figure due to quite small sample size, in order not to provide an inadequate impression. Thanks to Ray Cohn 
for his important comment on this. 23 
5b. What determines migrant selectivity? 
We first estimate the factors determining migrant selectivity in an OLS framework using the 
following equation:  
(3)   Sijt = Inequijt + log(Migijt-1) + PovConstit+ Log (Distij) + PovConstit * Log (Distij)  
+ Demijt + Languageij + Colonyij + Civil Warit + Relative Democracyijt +  
Fixed Effectsi + Fixed Effectsj+ Fixed Effectst 
Skill-selectivity of migrants Sijt observed in destination country j from source country i in 
migration decade t is our dependent variable. The prominent explanatory variable is Inequijt, 
which is the relative Gini coefficient from destination and source country in a given migration 
decade. This is the coefficient of interest, when analyzing the Roy-Borjas relationship. Next, 
we control for a set of standard migration variables that could also impact on migrant 
selectivity, such as the friends-and-relatives-effect, which we proxy with the log of the 
absolute immigrants observed in destination country j from source country i in t-1, log(Migijt-
1) that is, in the decade previous to the estimated migration decade. PovConstit is a variable 
that controls for the development level of the source country i as a possible poverty constraint. 
The log distance, Log (Distij), between the capitals of source and destination countries is also 
included. The poverty constraint is also interacted with log distance, since we would expect 
the poverty constraint to be more binding in case of a transatlantic journey then in the case of 
intra-European migration because of the lower material and psychological migration costs in 
the latter case. Additionally, we control for common language, Languageij and colonial ties, 
Colonyij.
22 And finally, we control for Relative Democracyijt of source and destination country 
and Civil Warit at the time of emigration in the source country.  
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 4. The migrant selectivity variable is 
distributed between -27.9 and +52.0 numeracy points with an unweighted mean of -4.3, 
indicating that on average, migrants were slightly negatively selected. Relative Gini 
                                                 
22 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm, last accessed 15.10.2010 24 
coefficients are distributed between -28 and 22. The raw migrant share variable displayed 
some left skewness, which is why we take the logs.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Migrant selectivity  303  -4.3  8.2  -27.9  52.0 
Relative inequality 
(anthrop.)  303  -3.9  8.2  -28.0  22.0 
Relative inequality 
(non anthrop.)  82  1.0  12.7  -42.4  28.6 
Ln migrant share  303  0.6  2.1  -5.0  4.6 
Poverty constraint  303  0.9  0.3  0.0  2.1 
Ln distance  303  3.0  1.1  0.5  4.6 
Ln dist*pov. constr.  303  2.7  1.6  0.0  8.3 
Relative democr.  303  1.3  3.5  -5.7  10.0 
Common language  303  0.2  0.4  0.0  1.0 
Colonial r'ship  303  0.2  0.4  0.0  1.0 
 
Note: only the cases are included for which all explanatory variables (Table 5, Col 1) did not contain 
missing values. The variable “Relative inequality (non anthrop.)” refers to Table 7, Column 1. Sources: see data 
appendix. 
 
In our estimations, we always employ destination and source country fixed effects to 
capture country specific political and socio-cultural characteristics as well as the income 
situation in destination and source countries.  
As a result, relative inequality plays a consistent role in determining migrant 
selectivity (Table 5). The coefficients of this variable are positive and have the expected sign 
in all five specifications. The results confirm the relationship proposed by Roy (1951) and 
Borjas (1987). In the first regression, we include the Russian emigration, although it might 
have been partly determined by religious factors, as explained in the previous section. In the 
second to fifth column, it is excluded and our results remain the same. In column 2, 4 and 5 
we tested fixed effects models in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity (which is 
otherwise controlled with country dummies). The coefficient for relative inequality is robust 25 
in this specification, as well.
23 In column 4, we assess whether inequality matters only 
together with the friends and relatives effect, or only together with poverty constraints, which 
is not the case.  
Table 5: Baseline regressions of human capital selectivity (numeracy migrant in % - numeracy 
source country in %) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Estimation method  RE  FE  RE  FE  FE 
Source countries excluded  None  Russia  Russia  Russia  Russia 
Relative inequality dest - source  0.16***  0.17***  0.15**  0.13**  0.11* 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.034)  (0.063) 
Friends & relatives (previous mig.)  -0.48  -0.68  -0.43  -1.53**   
  (0.204)  (0.286)  (0.186)  (0.013)   
Poverty constraint (Gini/GDP sq.)  -0.26**  0.24  -0.19*  -0.10   
  (0.025)  (0.109)  (0.081)  (0.503)   
Ln distance  -2.07***    -1.70**     
  (0.010)    (0.029)     
Ln distance * poverty constraint  0.06*  -0.10**  0.04  0.01   
  (0.099)  (0.023)  (0.240)  (0.854)   
Relative democracy  -0.45         
  (0.428)         
Common Language  2.65    3.93**     
  (0.127)    (0.047)     
Colonial relationship  1.07    0.70     
  (0.562)    (0.751)     
Civil War        -2.19**   
        (0.035)   
Destination  Yes    Yes  No   
Source   Yes    Yes  No   
Time  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Destination-source country pairs  No  Yes, FE  No  Yes, FE Yes, FE 
Constant  1.28  -2.11*  -4.16  -3.11*  -1.11 
  (0.803)  (0.078)  (0.440)  (0.085)  (0.490) 
Observations  303  300  291  300  376 
R-squared (between)  0.854  0.0292  0.858  0.0579  0.0530 
R-squared (within)  0.160  0.0915  0.216  0.235  0.114 
R-squared (overall)  0.593  0.0406  0.590  0.0379  0.0402 
 
P-values based on robust standard errors are included in brackets. Migration decades 1820s-1900s are 
included. Column 1 and 3 are estimated with random effects models (but country dummies included), col. 2, 4 
and 5 are based on fixed effects estimates. Hausman test P-Value (0.2345) suggests, however, that a random 
effect estimator is consistent and efficient. Sources: see data appendix. 
 
                                                 
23 However, the Hausman test indicates that the random effects model is consistent and efficient (see notes to 
Table). 26 
Is the coefficient of relative inequality economically meaningful? One method of 
measuring economic significance is to consider the effects of one standard deviation of the 
explanatory variable. If we multiply the standard deviation of inequality (8.21) with its 
coefficient (0.17, col. 2 in Table 5), we obtain 1.39. This is roughly 17% of the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable (standard deviation: 8.16), which means that it can explain 
roughly one sixth of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. This amount is not very 
large, but it is also not negligible. If we do the same with the coefficient of the non-
anthropometric relative inequality variable below (Table 7, column 1: 0.29, and Table 4, line 
3), we obtain 3.68, which is around 45% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
This is a substantial share, indicating economic significance. 
The other variables had much less consistent effects. The friends and relatives effect 
has always the expected negative sign, but is only statistically significant in specification 4, 
Table 5 (and in Appendix Table D.2, column 1). This indicates some impact of already 
existing networks on the skill selectivity of new migrants, but the insignificance of many 
coefficients suggests that this effect was not very systematic. The provision of information 
and remittances might have encouraged also less positively selected individuals to migrate in 
some of the cases. 
The poverty constraint variable renders also no consistent results. It mainly has a 
negative sign and is twice significant. While Hatton and Williamson (1998) found that it was 
a determinant of migration flows, but human capital selectivity does not seem to be 
consistently related to this variable. 
We calculated a time variant measure of economic distance costs.
24 The strong decline 
of transport cost with the arrival of the steamship innovation features prominently here. Log 
(Distij) has a negative sign and becomes significant. This result might seem counter-intuitive, 
but the result might be due to the fact that the majority of the variance in the distance variable 
                                                 
24 We took the passenger cost estimates by Sanchez-Alonso (2008), and calculated the cost for distance unit for 
each decade. This is then multiplied with actual distances between population centres in the countries. (distance 
measures from http://www.cepii.fr/) 27 
stems from the difference in trans-Atlantic versus intra- European migration. We observe 
better selected individuals in European destination countries than in the U.S. or Argentina, for 
example, perhaps because the risky environment of the New World deterred skilled 
migrants.
25 
Relative democracy is controlled for based on the estimates of democracy produced by 
the Polity IV project.
26 It indicates the openness of democratic institutions in a country and is 
measured on a scale of -10 (low) to 10 (high). We subtracted the democracy score of the 
destination country from the one of the source country to obtain the relative democracy 
variable. One might expect that the more educated were attracted by higher democracy values 
in the destination country, relative to the source country (on the significant attraction of 
migrants of any skill, see Bertocchi and Strozzi 2008). This variable turns out to be 
insignificant, too. The politically motivated migration might have been too small in number 
during the 19
th century, or it was probably not sufficiently restricted to the more educated 
strata. 
Finally, we tested common language and colonial relationships, and found positive 
effects for language. A common language might have been more useful for the more educated 
who usually have a comparative advantage with words and skills, rather than with brawn. 
Colonial ties do not seem to matter. Finally, in column 4 of Table 5 we test for a potential 
effect of civil war in the country of origin, which turns out negative and significant. This 
                                                 
25 This is supported by the fact that when old world destinations are not included below in Column 5 of 
Appendix Table D.2, the variable gets a large positive value (p-value 0.103). As a second possible explanation, it 
could be speculated that migrants within Europe expected more skill competition in European destination labor 
markets. Figures 1 and 2 indicate this particularly for the case of Irish emigrants. 
We also include an interaction term between economic distance and poverty constraint, but it turns out mostly 
insignificant. In Table B.2 in the appendix we also tested whether the effect of distance and poverty constraint 
differ in the first half of the 19
th century, because as shipping technology improved, travelling across the Atlantic 
became less time consuming and costly. Therefore an interaction term of distance and the time dummies of the 
first half of the 19
th century was included (Appendix Table B.2). The result was a significant negative 
coefficient, indicating that in the early period, when migration was more costly, the impact of distance on 
migrant selectivity was even more negative than thereafter. This might be slightly more in line with the risk 
interpretation above, because in the early period the New World was still perceived as a risky world. An 
interaction term with the poverty measure and the first half of the 19
th century did not render significant results. 
26 Marshall, Monty G., and Jaggers, K. (2008): Polity IV Project: data set. 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  28 
variable is taken from the Correlates of War Project and Uppsala Conflict Data Project. It is 
coded as a dummy variable, turning 1 if civil war broke out in a given country and period. 
27 
5c. Tests of robustness, WLS, and direction of causality issues 
As a first test for robustness, we omitted the German, Irish and English migrants to test if our 
result were mainly driven by these very large immigrant groups. The results do not differ very 
much, and the Roy-Borjas forces remain strong (Appendix Table D.2, columns 1-3).
28  
An alternative robustness test is to weigh the observations with the square root of the 
number of migrants underlying each unit in a WLS regression which leads to more efficient 
estimates. The results in Table 6, column 1 to 4, are consistent with previous estimates: the 
relative inequality is a significant determinant of migrant selectivity. One potential 
disadvantage of weighted regressions is that a few source countries account for the majority of 
migrants; and thus they receive most of the weight in the estimates.
29 
Finally in column 5 of Table 6, we test the alternative measure for the friends-and-
relatives effect that we described in the notes to the Table, namely the number of migrants 
relative to home country population. Using this different specification does not change the 
                                                 
27 Civil war is defined as sustained combat with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year that takes place 
between the armed forces of a government and forces of another entity for central control or for local issues. 
Military and civilian deaths are counted. Source: Correlates of War Project and Uppsala Conflict Data Project. 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
28 If the Irish are omitted, the friends-and-relatives effects turns small and insignificant, this is neatly consistent 
with the literature that argued that this effect was particularly important for Irish migration (Cohn 2009). Next, 
we exclude the Irish and the Italian migrants, because here, the migration flows were very large in comparison to 
the home country population. Another way of validating the robustness of our results is to exclude migration to 
European destination countries (Appendix Table D.2, column 5). The result is that even if we look at only 
transatlantic migration, our results stay robust. 
29 While in the OLS estimations, common language had a positive effect on human capital selectivity, the WLS 
regressions suggest the opposite. Here the Irish, who were negatively selected and shared a common language 
with North Americans, gain a strong weight, because their N was large. A former colonial relationship also 
seems to be of importance in WLS: this variable turns highly significant and positive in all estimations, 
indicating that people, who migrated into a country to which they were linked by colonial ties, were more 
positively selected than migrants moving to other destination countries. This might have been caused partly by 
re-migration of the families of former colonial officials or similar special factors of the colonial administration. 
We also assessed whether the difference between migrant numeracy and source country numeracy might depend 
on the level of source country numeracy. Those coming from a high education background might have been 
more likely to be negatively selected, even if we have seen many counter-examples in the Figures discussed 
above. We therefore include a term “ABCC level source country”, which indeed turns significant but did not 
change the main results (Table 6, column 3). In a similar exercise to evaluate the properties of the dependent 
variable, we included only those in which the source country numeracy deviates from the optimum of 100 
percent (Table 6, column 4). This removes some 35 cases, relative to column 2, but again the coefficients do not 
change. 29 
significance of the Borjas variable, and most other significance levels also do not change 
(distance is the exception).  
A comprehensive test of the properties of time series indicated that the main series as 
well as the residuals do not display unit root problems. The Fisher test for unbalanced panels, 
as well as the Hadri-LM-test for the three largest source countries in a balanced panel, were 
calculated and suggest that our series do not suffer from non-stationarity. 
 
Table 6: Regression of human capital selectivity, weighted by number of underlying 
observations 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Estimation method  WLS  WLS  WLS  WLS  WLS 
Included abcc range  All  All  All  <100  <100 
Friends and relatives, relative to  Migrants  Migrants  Migrants  Migrants  Source country 
Relative inequality dest - source  0.15**  0.14**  0.17***  0.16**  0.11* 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.071) 
Friends & relatives (previous mig.)  -0.03  -0.03  0.16  -0.44  0.17 
  (0.908)  (0.909)  (0.527)  (0.143)  (0.352) 
Poverty constraint (Gini/GDP sq.)  -0.19  -0.19  -0.10  -0.08  0.22 
  (0.167)  (0.163)  (0.456)  (0.685)  (0.196) 
Ln distance  -2.63***  -2.64***  -1.96***  -2.58***  -0.38 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.701) 
Ln distance * poverty constraint  0.06*  0.06*  0.03  0.03  -0.07 
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.384)  (0.492)  (0.114) 
Relative democracy  0.30         
  (0.453)         
Common Language  -1.10  -1.10  -1.23  -0.52  0.80 
  (0.447)  (0.447)  (0.365)  (0.745)  (0.773) 
Colonial relationship  5.57***  5.57***  5.81***  6.52***  6.76** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021) 
ABCC level source country      -0.71***     
      (0.000)     
Destination  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  4.17  2.53  71.15***  4.95  0.01 
  (0.374)  (0.632)  (0.000)  (0.389)  (0.999) 
Observations  303  312  312  267  201 
R-squared  0.64  0.64  0.71  0.65  0.70 
 
P-values based on robust standard errors are included in brackets. Migration decades 1820s-1900s are included. 
Russia excluded. Sources: see data appendix. 
The line “Friends and relatives relative to” defines the concept which we applied to calculate the friends and 
relatives effects: We focus on two relative measures of the “friends-and-relatives” factor: (1) the number of 
migrants relative to the home country population (used in Column 5) and (2) the number of migrants of a given 
nationality, relative to the total migrant population in a destination country (used in Column 1 to 4 and other 
Tables). Both refer to the decade preceding migration of the individuals whose selectivity we aim to explain. 
Concept (1) would measure the number of potential relatives who could send remittances, per capita of the 30 
source country. Assuming that the wealth of all previous immigrants would be similar, this is a convincing 
indicator. However, it has considerable data requirements, and population estimates in some of the source 
countries are not available. We could construct this measure only for 201 country pairs, for which relative 
inequality and other explanatory variables were available. 31 
Table 7: Regression of human capital selectivity on non-anthropometric inequality measures 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Estimation method  RE  RE  FE  WLS  WLS  WLS 
Relative inequality dest - source  0.29**  0.28*  0.24**  0.34*  0.34*  0.38* 
  (0.024)  (0.058)  (0.029)  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.080) 
Friends & relatives (previous mig.)  -0.24  -0.23  -0.24  0.16  0.16  0.37 
  (0.657)  (0.729)  (0.813)  (0.738)  (0.738)  (0.391) 
Poverty constraint (Gini/GDP sq.)  -11.47**  -11.53**  -5.49  -16.74**  -16.74**  -11.84 
  (0.043)  (0.021)  (0.321)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.146) 
Ln distance  -1.95  -2.12    -4.13***  -4.13***  -3.58** 
  (0.244)  (0.213)    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Ln distance * poverty constraint  2.26  2.41  0.23  5.93***  5.93***  5.02** 
  (0.269)  (0.235)  (0.928)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.023) 
Relative democracy  -0.38  1.61*    -0.47     
  (0.745)  (0.068)    (0.540)     
Common Language  0.74  0.64    -0.08  -0.08  -1.45 
  (0.835)  (0.887)    (0.981)  (0.981)  (0.603) 
Colonial relationship  -1.78  -1.87    -2.08  -2.08  -1.25 
  (0.537)  (0.691)    (0.411)  (0.411)  (0.622) 
Civil War    -1.10  -0.50       
    (0.668)  (0.841)       
ABCC level source country            -0.74 
            (0.103) 
Destination  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source   Yes  Yes  Yes, FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -4.34  7.79  -0.84  5.35  61.01***  87.60*** 
  (0.632)  (0.390)  (0.789)  (0.424)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  82  82  82  82  82  82 
R-square between  0.866  0.867  0.0275       
R-square within  0.215  0.216  0.232       
R-square overall  0.788  0.789  0.0318  0.79  0.79  0.81 
 
Source: Sources: see data appendix. Van Zanden et al. (2011) recently presented estimates of global inequality 
based on both anthropometric and non-anthropometric inequality measures, and they kindly provided the latter to 
us. 32 
Table 8: Arellano Bond dynamic panel regressions 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Relative skill premium dest - source  0.13***  0.10** 
  (0.002)  (0.018) 
Relative inequality dest - source  0.21  0.09 
  (0.107)  (0.475) 
Friends & relatives (previous mig.)  0.17  -0.44 
  (0.808)  (0.557) 
Poverty constraint (Gini/GDP sq.)    -0.06 
    (0.783) 
Log distance    -5.12** 
    (0.039) 
Ln distance * poverty constraint    0.00 
    (0.984) 
Constant  -3.50***  12.81* 
  (0.000)  (0.094) 
Observations  228  228 
No(instruments)  45  48 
p-value of Wald chi2  0.002  0.000 
 
Migration decades 1820s-1900s are included. Russia excluded. We use the entire lag structure for 
instrumentation, i.e. starting from the (t-2) lag of the difference for the levels equation, and the (t-1) lag of the 
level for the difference equations. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences. Prob > z: 0.19. The Sargan 
test of overidentifying restrictions yielded a chi2 of 47.26 (Prob > chi2 = 0.23). Sources: see data appendix. 
 
As a further robustness test, we assessed whether the results would be confirmed using 
non-anthropometric inequality measures. As explained above, Van Zanden et al. (2011) 
recently presented estimates of global inequality based on both anthropometric and non-
anthropometric inequality measures, and we include the latter in Table 7. Those non-
anthropometric inequality measures actually yield the same signs for the Borjas variable as 
our basic specification and their coefficient is even somewhat larger, which is probably 
caused by the different set of countries and decades that can be covered with this alternative 
measure of relative inequality. This result is a very strong confirmation of robustness of the 
main results of interest here. Moreover, we also performed a robustness test about the 
accuracy of migration decade estimates.
30 
                                                 
30 Previously, our assumption was that, for example, those rounding on 40 would do so from true ages 
symmetrically lower or higher (for example, ages 38 to 42 being rounded to 40). For the robustness test, we now 33 
Next we considered the problem of endogeneity. Theoretically, one could imagine that a 
massive exodus of a large and highly selected part of a population would influence relative 
inequality of the source country, since relative inequality should ceteris paribus decline, if, for 
example, a large share of unskilled workers leaves. In most countries, however, the 
requirement of a large share of the population leaving is not fulfilled, since emigration rates 
were normally below 5 percent per decade. Exceptions are Ireland, from where in some 
decades more than 10 percent left, and Italy right before WWI (Hatton and Williamson, 
1998). This means that a problem of reverse causality might arise as a large, and strongly 
selective migrant flow might in turn affect income distribution in the source country. The only 
migration flows that were so large are the Irish and the Italian. If we exclude them from our 
regressions, the results stay robust (Appendix Table D.2, column 4). Hence, we conclude that 
the direction of causality issue is not affecting our results generally. 
Finally, we tested whether our results also hold when a Generalized Method of 
Moments estimator is applied (Arellano and Bond, 1991). While this method is 
conventionally used in dynamic settings to account for the likely endogeneity of lagged 
dependent variables, it basically generates a large number of instrumental variables from 
lagged first difference values of the dependent variable. This estimation in first differences is 
of advantage, because it allows us to make sure that trend correlation is not a problem here. 
Again, the relative inequality coefficients turn out robust (Table 8). 
To conclude, a wide range of econometric techniques suggests that relative inequality 
had an effect on migrant selectivity as measured by relative numeracy with the age heaping 
method. There is some evidence -- although more limited -- on friends-and relatives-effects, 
                                                                                                                                                         
hypothesized that only ages 37 to 41 rounded to 40. In a second step, we did the same with 39 to 43. We are well 
aware that this introduces artificial measurement error, because the symmetric rounding is the more likely factual 
behavior. Hence the results would be expected to yield slightly less significant results, but a small variation 
should not completely change the results. This is exactly what happened. Of the coefficients, 100 percent kept 
the same sign and the same order of magniturde, and almost all remained significant. In very few cases, the p-
values of statistical significance went slightly over 0.10, as we would have expected since we are introducing 
artificial measurement error in this robustness test. 34 
colonial relationships and common language, whereas counteracting forces might have 
rendered the effects of economic distance and democracy mostly insignificant. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we assessed the selectivity of migrants in the era of mass migration. We focus 
not only on the main transatlantic migration destinations, but also on two European 
destination countries, the UK and Norway. No less than 52 source countries could be 
included, with 127 country pair flows. The underlying data set is based on 6.2 million 
individual migrants.  
The main model tested is the Roy Model of self-selection (1951) that Borjas applied to 
the process of migration (1987). It states a relationship between skill selectivity of migrants 
and relative inequality of source and destination countries, measured with an anthropometric 
indicator here. We confirm the influence of these economic migration incentives after 
controlling for a large number of other variables such as “friends and relatives effects”, 
poverty constraints, economic distance, relative democracy, common language and colonial 
relationships. Even if we used non-anthropometric inequality measures, regressions actually 
yield the same signs for the Borjas variable as our basic specification and the coefficient is 
even somewhat larger. This study has been the first general assessment of migrant selectivity 
during this most crucial period of human migration history, using large samples that included 
a variety of different source and destination countries. 
It is crucial to understand the brain-drain processes between source and destination 
countries, because the stock of human capital determines future growth capabilities. Brain 
drain effects have not been systematically studied for the era of mass migration of the mid-to-
late 19
th century with large international samples before. In the case of mid-19
th century mass 
migration history, we also noted some arithmetic brain gains for the source countries, since 
those who left Scandinavia or central Europe around mid-century were often less numerate 
than the remaining population. There could have been, for instance, marginal positive human 
capital growth effects in Germany or in some Scandinavian countries, because the average 35 
numeracy should have increased with migration, due to negatively selected emigration. In 
contrast, Eastern Europe lost a large number of the numerate population, and the migration 
effects might have been ceteris paribus negative. Clearly, also a large number of other factors 
were at work, which is why these effects should not be seen in isolation.  
Can we draw a wider pricture, comparing today’s migration with the era of mass 
migration? Two main differences are obvious. Firstly, in the world today, immigration 
policies play a much stronger role than in the 19
th century, making it very hard for many 
unskilled potential migrants to jump over immigration hurdles. Hence each consideration of 
relative inequality incentives has to be ceteris paribus. A second major difference in this big 
picture is that today many migrants come from countries with higher inequality. This fact 
fueled the Borjas debate about potentially problematic selectivity of migrants coming from 
Mexico to the United States in the recent past. In the 19
th and early 20
th century, this was 
clearly different, because source and destination country inequalities were almost equal. 
However, the debate about migrant education in the U.S. before WWI was also mostly 
motivated by immigration from countries in Southern and Eastern Europe which were 
characterised by relatively high inequality. Even if the absolute level of education was the 
main issue of debate, the Borjas forces were also influential in the background. In sum, when 
designing immigration policies today, both the recent and the historical experience can 
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Migrant numeracy: Difference between the numeracy of migrants and the joint weighted numeracy of stayers 
and migrants (except for countries in which migration was small, see the longer footnote in the ‘skill selectivity’ 
section). Numeracy in the source countries are from Crayen and Baten (2010a). On the sources of migrants: 
Census evidence was available for Argentina (1869, 1895) – sample of circa 2 percent; Canada (1871, 1881-
100%, 1901); Norway (1865, 1875, 1900); England (1851, 1881); US (1850, 1860, 1870, 1880-100%, 1900, 
1910). Sources of those censuses: On the U.S. except 1880: Ruggles, Steven, Matthew Sobek, and Trent 
Alexander, et al. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0 [Machine-readable database]. 
Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2004. On Argentina: Somoza, J. and 
Lattes, A. (1967. Muestras de los dos primeros censos nacionales de población, 1869 y 1895. Documento de 
Trabajo No 46, Instituto T. Di Tella, CIS, Buenos Aires. On all other samples: North Atlantic Population Project 
and Minnesota Population Center. NAPP: Complete Count Microdata. NAPP Version 2.0 [computer files]. 
Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [distributor], 2008. [http://www.nappdata.org]. 
We used the migration numbers in Ferenczi and Willcox to identify the countries in which the migration rate 
exceeded one percent per decade to a given target country (in most cases, there was only one target country with 
such substantial migration). For the periods before 1870, we used the stock of migrants in the target countries, 
and compared overlapping numbers between Ferenczi and Willcox and census data in order to make sure that the 
differences in counting (Ferenczi and Willcox focus on migration statistics, hence an Irish migrant to Canada 
might have finally gone to the U.S; the census stock excludes those who died between migration and census 
taking). But the correspondence between both sources was quite good. For example, for the 1860s Ferenczi and 
Willcox list some 700,000 migrants from the UK (incl. Ireland) to the U.S., whereas the stock in the 1880s that 
we estimated to have migrated during the 1860s was 660,000. We then calculated the weighted average of 
numeracy of stayers and migrants. Only for very few cases we had to assume similar values to the ones of other 
migrants (for example, we assumed that Spanish migration to Brazil in the 1880s was similar to the one to 
Argentina in the 1880s etc.). 
 
Relative Inequality Dest-Source (anthrop.):: height gini of the destination county minus the height gini of the 
source county, from Blum and Baten (2012), Estimating Inequality with Anthropometric Indicators, for an online 
version, see http://www.wiwi.uni-tuebingen.de/cms/fileadmin/ Uploads/Schulung/Schulung5/ 
Joerg/Baten_Blum_skpr100331a.pdf, last accessed March 31
st, 2010.  
Moradi and Baten (2005) recommended the following formula for translating height CVs into ‘height ginis’ 
(ibid: p.29), which we will use below: 
(3)         Giniit=-33.5+20.5*CVit 
 
Relative Inequality (non-anthrop.): Gini coefficients of income inequality of the destination county minus the 
Gini coefficient of the source county, from van Zanden et al. (2011), friendly provided by the authors. The 
authors include all estimates of income inequality: direct estimates based on tax and other statistical surveys, 
indirect estimates based on the share of income of the richest fraction of the population, and indirect estimates 
based on the ratio between average income and the wages of unskilled workers (the ‘Williamson method’).  42 
 
Friends and relatives (previous mig.): The share of migrants from one source country in one destination country, 
relative to the total number of migrants in this destination country. It was calculated with migrant data sets cited 
above under Migrant numeracy. In Table 6, column 5, this variable is defined as the number of migrants in 
country j from country i, relative to the population in country i. Population comes from Maddison (2009). When 
census years were less than two decades from each other, we used linear interpolation for the number of migrants 
for the latter measure, and population figures were also interpolated between Maddison’s years of observation, 
but only if sensible start year population figures were available. 
 
Poverty constraint: Height ginis divided by GDP per capita squared (multiplied with 1 million), Height ginis are 
based on Blum and Baten (2011, see Relative above), GDP on Maddison (2009), and for those countries for 
which values were lacking we used the imputations first done by Baten and Blum (2010), see 
http://www.wiwi.uni-
tuebingen.de/cms/fileadmin/Uploads/Schulung/Schulung5/Joerg/baten_blum_ht_100331a.pdf last accessed 
March 31
st, 2010.  
 
Distance: Log distance is taken from http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm last accessed March 
31
st, 2010. The distance was then multiplied with the passenger cost estimates by Sanchez-Alonso (2008) to 
account for the decline in distance costs.  
 
Colonial ties: see distance; it is a dummy which is one if source and destination countries had a colonial 
relationship at some point in time. 
 
Common language: see distance. It is a dummy which is one if the population majority in the source and 
destination countries had the same language. 
 
Relative democracy: Evidence from the Polity IV project, see Marshall, Monty G., and Jaggers, K.(2008): Polity 
IV Project: data set. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm last accessed March 31
st, 2010. We took 
the overall democracy index. The values vary between –10 and 10, and we took the value in the destination 
country minus the one of the source country. 
 
Civil War data is from the Correlates of War Project, see Singer, J. David and Melvin Small (1972): The Wages 
of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New York. Or see http://www.correlatesofwar.org last accessed 
March 31
st, 2010. It is a dummy variable which is 1 if a country had a civil war conflict with at least 1,000 battle 
deaths per year. 43 
Internet Appendix B (not to be included in the published version): additional Tables 
 
Appendix Table B.2: Regression of migrant selectivity: interaction with early/late period 
  (1)  (2) 
Estimation method  RE  RE 
Source countries excluded  Russia  Russia 
Gini Destination Premium  0.15***  0.15*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Friends&Family (Ln Migr)  -0.51  -0.46 
  (0.198)  (0.230) 
Poverty Constraint  -0.20*  -0.18 
  (0.061)  (0.106) 
Ln distance  -1.54*  -1.74** 
  (0.062)  (0.037) 
Ln distance * poverty constraint 0.04  0.04 
  (0.208)  (0.284) 
Relative democracy  -0.41  -0.44 
  (0.421)  (0.393) 
Common Language  4.08**  3.99** 
  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Colonial relationship  0.73  0.88 
  (0.706)  (0.665) 
Early * distance  -1.14**    
   (0.029)    
Early * poverty constraint     0.00 
      (0.987) 
Destination fixed eff.  Yes  Yes 
Source fixed eff.  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed eff.  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.18  -4.02 
  (0.972)  (0.432) 
Observations  291  291 
R-squared (between)  0.864  0.864 
R-squared (within)  0.216  0.201 
R-squared (overall)  0.592  0.587 
  
Note: As a threshold value for early/late, we used 1850, because the freight rate index by 
Harley (1998, also reprinted in O’Rourke and Williamson 1999) showed a much stronger 
decline of freight rates after 1850. 
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Not for publication: Appendix C: Methodology and basic concepts of age heaping 
(Internet Appendix) 
We study numerical abilities in this article, which are an important component of overall 
human capital. In order to provide estimates of very basic components of numeracy, we will 
apply the age heaping methodology.
31 The idea is that in less developed countries of the past, 
only a certain share of the population was able to report the own age exactly when census-
takers, army recruitment officers, or prison officials asked for it. The remaining population 
reported a rounded age, for example, 40, when they were in fact 39 or 41. In today’s world of 
obligatory schooling, passports, universities, birth documents, and bureaucracy, it is hard to 
imagine that people did not know their exact age. But in early and less organized societies this 
was clearly different. The typical result is an age distribution with spikes at ages ending in a 
five or a zero and an underrepresentation of other ages, which does not reflect the true age 
distribution. There was also some heaping on multiples of two, which was quite widespread 
among children and teenagers and to a lesser extent among young adults in their twenties. 
This shows that most individuals actually knew their age as teenagers, but only in well-
educated societies were they able to remember or calculate their exact age again later in life.
32 
To give an example of rounding on multiples of five, the census of Mexico City 1790 
reports 410 people aged 40, but only 42 aged 41. This was clearly caused by age heaping. 
Apolant (1975, p. 333) gives individual examples of age misreporting: Joseph Milan, who 
appeared in February 1747 as a witness in an Uruguayan court, should have been 48 years old, 
according to one judicial record. However, in the same year, but in another judicial record, he 
declares his age to be ’45 years’. Demographers see this age misreporting as a problem when 
calculating life expectancies and other population statistics. But exactly this misreporting 
enables us to approximate numerical abilities of historical populations. The ratio between the 
preferred ages and the others can be calculated by using several indices, one of them being the 
Whipple index.
33 To calculate the Whipple index of age heaping, the number of persons 
reporting a rounded age ending with 0 or 5 is divided by the total number of people, and this 
is subsequently multiplied by 500. Thus, the index measures the proportion of people who 
                                                 
31 For more detailed surveys on the age heaping methodology see A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009). 
32 At higher ages, this heaping pattern is mostly negligible, but interestingly somewhat stronger among 
populations who are numerate enough not to round on multiples of five. 
33 A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009) found that this index is the only one that fulfils the desired properties of 
scale independence (a linear response to the degree of heaping), and that it ranks samples with different degrees 
of heaping reliably. 45 
state an age ending in a five or zero, assuming that each terminal digit should appear with the 
same frequency in the ‘true’ age distribution.
34  
(1)  100
) 62 .. 25 24 23 5 / 1


















For an easier interpretation, A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009) suggested another 
index, which we call the ABCC index.
35 It is a simple linear transformation of the Whipple 












ABCC  if  100 ≥ Wh ; else 100 = ABCC . 
  The share of persons able to report an exact age turns out to be highly correlated with 
other measures of human capital, like literacy and schooling, both across countries, 
individuals, and over time (Bachi 1951, Myers 1954, Mokyr 1983, A’Hearn, Baten, and 
Crayen 2009). A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009) found that the relationship between 
illiteracy and age heaping for less developed countries (LDCs) after 1950 is very close. They 
calculated age heaping and illiteracy for not less than 270,000 individuals who were organized 
by 416 regions, ranging from Latin America to Oceania.
36 The correlation coefficient with 
illiteracy was as high as 0.7. The correlation with the PISA results for numerical skills was 
even as high as 0.85, hence the Whipple index is more strongly correlated with numerical 
skills. They also used a large U.S. census sample to perform a very detailed analysis of this 
relationship. They subdivided by race, gender, high and low educational status, and other 
criteria. In each case, they obtained a statistically significant relationship. Remarkable is also 
the fact that the coefficients are relatively stable between samples, i.e., a unit change in age 
heaping is associated with similar changes in literacy across the various tests. The results are 
not only valid for the U.S.: In any country with substantial age heaping that has been studied 
so far, the correlation was both statistically and economically significant. 
In order to assess the robustness of those U.S. census results and the similar 
conclusions drawn from late 20
th century LDCs, A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009) also 
assessed age heaping and literacy in 16 different European countries between the Middle Ages 
and the early 19
th century. Again, they found a positive correlation between age heaping and 
                                                 
34 A value of 500 means an age distribution with ages ending only on multiples of five, whereas 100 indicates no 
heaping patterns on multiples of five, that is exactly 20 percent of the population reported an age ending in a 
multiple of five.  
35 The name results from the initials of the authors’ last names plus Greg Clark’s, who suggested this in a 
comment on their paper. Whipple indexes below 100 are normally caused by random variation of birth rates in 
the 20
th century rich countries. They are not carrying important information, hence normally set to 100 in the 
ABCC index. 
36 See A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009), Appendix available from the authors. 46 
literacy, although the relationship was somewhat weaker than for the 19
th or 20
th century data. 
It is likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early modern data caused the 
lower statistical significance.  
Age heaping has also been compared to other human capital indicators, for example, 
primary schooling rates. The widest geographical sample studied so far was created by Crayen 
and Baten (2010a), who were able to include 70 countries for which both age heaping and 
schooling data (as well as other explanatory variables) were available. They found in a series 
of cross-sections between the 1880s and 1940s that primary schooling and age heaping were 
closely correlated, with R-squares between 0.55 and 0.76 (including other control variables; 
see below). Again, the coefficients were relatively stable over time. This large sample also 
allowed the examination of various other potential determinants of age heaping. To assess 
whether the degree of bureaucracy, birth registration, and government interaction with citizens 
are likely to influence the knowledge of one’s exact age, independently of personal education, 
the authors used the number of censuses performed for each individual country for the period 
under study as an explanatory variable for their age heaping measure. Except for countries 
with a very long history of census-taking, all variations of this variable turned out 
insignificant, which would suggest that an independent bureaucracy effect was rather weak. In 
other words, it is sometimes the case that societies with a high number of censuses had high 
age awareness. But, at the same time, these societies were also early in introducing schooling 
and this variable clearly had more explanatory power in a joint regression than the 
independent bureaucracy effect. Crayen and Baten also tested whether the general standard of 
living had an influence on age heaping tendencies (using height as well as GDP per capita to 
serve as a proxy for welfare) and found a varying influence: in some decades, there was a 
statistically significant correlation, but in others there was none. Cultural determinants of age 
heaping were also observable, but their strongest influence was visible in East Asia, not in the 
Latin American countries under study in this article. 
  In this article, we employ the ABCC measure of age heaping, computing indexes for 
different countries and birth decades. In order to do so, we use the age groups 23-32, 33-42, 
etc.
37 we omitted the age range from 63 to 72, as this age group offers too few observations, 
especially for the 17
th and 18
th centuries, when mortality was relatively high.
38  
                                                 
37 An advantage of this method is to spread the preferred ages, such as 25 or 30, more evenly within the age 
groups and it adjusts also for the fact that more people will be alive at age 50 than at age 54 or at age 55 than at 
age 59 (Crayen and Baten 2010b). 
38 Given that young adults aged 23 to 32 round partly on multiples of two rather than five, we use the adjustment 
method suggested by Crayen and Baten (2010a) to increase the Whipple value (minus 100) by 24 percent, before 
calculating the ABCC measure. 47 
  An advantage of the age heaping methodology is that age statements are more widely 
available than other human capital proxies like signature ability or school attendance. As Reis 
(2008) argues, the age heaping measure is a very basic measure of human capital. Therefore, 
it is especially valid to study human capital development in Latin America in the 17
th and 18
th 
centuries when more advanced human capital indicators were quite scarce and reflected only 
the skills of the elite. 48 
Not for publication: Appendix C: Literacy as an alternative measure of skill selectivity 
Interestingly, while some specialized studies have used the occupational structure and age 
heaping of migrants as indicators, literacy of migrants was not used before. Unfortunately, 
literacy of immigrants at arrival was only assessed in the U.S. starting in 1899, when the U.S. 
public grew concerned with the educational status of recent mass immigration from Southern 
and Eastern Europe, and those lists are not available as individual data sets. 
Literacy was also recorded in the censuses between 1850 and 1910, but the comparison 
between the literacy of immigrants in the U.S. and the population in the source country is 
difficult for a number of reasons. Firstly, literacy in source countries was recorded using a 
number of different definitions. Some sources recorded literacy of the adult population, 
whereas the majority recorded those aged 15 and older, 10 and older or even six years and 
older.
1 Many statistics report just one number for the whole population which makes it 
impossible to calculate literacy of age groups or to obtain time series by birth cohorts. 
Secondly, literacy of individuals coming from different linguistic backgrounds is always 
difficult to measure. Even if census takers were instructed to record literacy in any language 
and not only in the official language of the destination country, migrants from different 
language families could still have declared themselves illiterate when they were asked by 
census takers. We compared literacy and age heaping from the census data of the different 
migrant groups in the United States directly. Migrants with a Romanic-language background, 
namely Italy and Portugal, displayed average numeracy values. However, they had 
significantly lower literacy rates than one would expect according to their average numeracy. 
Thirdly, although the vast majority arrived as young adults, a part of the migrants came as 
children and teenagers to the United States. Already for the mid-19th century, Cohn (2009) 
reports roughly one quarter arriving as children. When we look at the literacy of persons with 
migration background in the census some years later, we therefore have to be aware that many 
of them acquired literacy when they already lived in the United States. So the literacy 
performance is not only influenced by selective migration but also by age structure and 
schooling possibilities for migrants. To make things even more complicated, the U.S. was 
often the destination for migrants coming from countries with lower schooling (Eastern and 
Southern Europe), but also from countries with better schooling than the U.S., such as 
Sweden, Norway and so on. The children of those migrant families might have “lost” some of 
the schooling they would have obtained in their source countries if they had not migrated. 
Therefore, there exist various biases of different directions which are difficult to quantify. For 
these reasons, the study of U.S. migrant selectivity based on literacy is too difficult at the 49 
present stage of knowledge. Fortunately, the age heaping techniques provides a feasible 




Appendix Table D.1: Average number of underlying cases for each decade, destination and 
source country, by migration decade and destination country 
Destination  1820  1830  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880  1890  1900 
Argentina    109  265  428  721  655  623    
Canada  197  10664  8723  7228 5220  4352  381  421  
Norway  527  878  1490  2511  2120  2002  1798  1655  
UK  1451  1208  1611  515  411  376      
US  915  13006  24900  32064  35651  30703  989  941  655 
 
Notes: For example, 109 was the average number of cases of all source countries that provided migrants to 
Argentina in the 1830s. 
Sources: see data appendix. 51 
Appendix Table D.2: Robustness of human capital selectivity regression: excluding some of 
the source and destination countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Countries excluded  Germany  Ireland  UK  Ireland & Italy  Old World  
Source or Destination  Source  Source  Source  Source  Destination 
Relative inequality dest - source  0.14**  0.13**  0.14**  0.11*  0.17*** 
  (0.019)  (0.041)  (0.023)  (0.084)  (0.005) 
Friends & relatives (previous mig.)  -0.74*  -0.14  -0.57  -0.17  -0.09 
  (0.059)  (0.666)  (0.136)  (0.595)  (0.803) 
Poverty constraint (Gini/GDP sq.)  -0.14  -0.17  -0.19*  -0.11  -0.18 
  (0.286)  (0.128)  (0.095)  (0.332)  (0.603) 
Ln distance  -1.96**  -0.79  -1.67**  -0.36  5.45 
  (0.023)  (0.339)  (0.037)  (0.662)  (0.103) 
Ln distance * poverty constraint  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.04 
  (0.444)  (0.368)  (0.237)  (0.748)  (0.712) 
Common Language  4.99**  5.17***  3.13  6.20***  2.49 
  (0.028)  (0.007)  (0.156)  (0.001)  (0.105) 
Colonial relationship  1.26  -1.93  -0.05  -3.13  5.64** 
  (0.603)  (0.414)  (0.983)  (0.172)  (0.018) 
           
Destination  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.14  -6.92  -0.90  -10.02*  -29.39** 
  (0.984)  (0.252)  (0.890)  (0.094)  (0.018) 
Observations  272  281  277  263  229 
R-square between  0.861  0.879  0.864  0.885  0.917 
R-square within  0.227  0.158  0.188  0.170  0.217 
R-square overall  0.594  0.607  0.588  0.620  0.616 
 
P-values based on robust standard errors are included in brackets. Migration decades 1820s-1900s are included. 
Russia excluded. Sources: see data appendix. All estimates are random effects. 52 
Appendix Figure D.1 Panel A: Age distribution of 23 to 82 year old population in the UK, 
1881 census 
 
Sources: see data appendix. 
 
Appendix Figure D.1 Panel B: Age distribution of 23 to 82 year old immigrant population 
from the UK, living in the US, 1880 census 
 
Notes to Appendix Figure D.1 Panel A and B: we performed logit regressions of the migrant status on numeracy 
by decades. The migrant variable always rendered a negative, highly significant coefficient. Hence, migrants in 
this panel have a statistically significant lower chance of being numerate than the source country population of 
the UK. 
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